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I. Introduction 
Forty-two states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have 
charter schools.1 As of 2010, there were nearly 5,000 charter schools 
educating around 1.5 million students.2 Charter schools are established 
through a “performance contract detailing the school’s mission, program, 
goals, students served, methods of assessment, and ways to measure 
success.”3 Charter schools usually receive a contract of three to five years.4 
At the end of the contract, a charter authorizer may renew the contract 
based on the school’s ability to meet the requirements set in the contract.5 
In exchange for this accountability, charter schools receive waivers 
exempting them from a number of restrictions that apply to traditional 
public schools.6  
Charter schools are becoming increasingly popular to students of 
color, especially African-American students.7 According to a 2010 survey 
conducted by Harvard’s Program on Educational Policy Governance and 
the journal, Education Next, 64% of African-Americans support charter 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See THE CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS THE STATES 
(2012), http://www.edreform.com/issues/choice-charter-schools/laws-legislation/ (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2012) (noting that the states without charter schools are Alabama, Kentucky, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and West 
Virginia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 2. See GARY MIRON ET AL., SCHOOLS WITHOUT DIVERSITY: EDUCATION 
MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC STRATIFICATION 
OF THE AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM 1 (2010), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/ 
publication/schools-without-diversity (explaining the rapid growth of charter schools over 
the past two decades) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice).  
 3. U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Charter Schools: An Overview and History of Charter 
Schools, USINFO.ORG, http://usinfo.org/enus/education/overview/charter_ schools_ 
history.html (last visited April 1, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 4. See id. (“The length of time for which charters are granted varies, but most are 
granted for 3–5 years.”).  
 5. See id. (providing an overview of the charter renewal process).  
 6. PRESTON C. GREEN & JULIE F. MEAD, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE LAW: 
ESTABLISHING NEW LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 5–6 (2004) (stating that charter schools are 
relieved from certain regulations in exchange for achieving certain educational outcomes). 
 7. Paul E. Peterson & Martin West, African-Americans for Charter Schools, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487042718045 
75405121906353464.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (“Support for charters among African 
Americans rose to 49% in 2009, up from 42% in 2008. [In 2010] it leapt upward to no less 
than 64%.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
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schools while 14% of African-Americans were opposed.8 Scholars have 
also asserted that charter schools may more effectively meet the need of 
African-American and Latino students than traditional public schools.9 
They have emphasized the charter schools’ ability to adopt educational 
themes that specifically address the educational needs of students of color, a 
small school size, and the flexibility in hiring teachers as reasons for such 
optimism.10  
Critics have countered that charter schools may not be an effective 
alternative for students of color because they are even more segregated than 
traditional public schools.11 The percentage of black charter school students 
in 90–100% minority schools12 is nearly twice as high as is the case for 
black traditional public school students (70% compared to 36%).13 Also, 
43% of black charter school students attended schools in which 99% or 
more of the enrollment were students of color.14 Although segregation is 
not as extreme for Latino students in charter schools, 50% of these students 
also attend 90–100% minority charter schools, compared to 38% of Latino 
traditional public school students.15 These statistics are disconcerting 
because schools with high percentages of racial minorities are more likely 
than predominantly white schools to have problems with teacher turnover.16 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id.  
 9. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Charting a New 
Course, 106 YALE L. J. 2375, 2404 (1997) (noting the potential advantages charter schools 
provide for parental involvement and local control); see Preston C. Green III, Preventing 
School Desegregation Decrees from Becoming Barriers to Charter School Innovation, 144 
EDUC. L. REP. 15, 23 (2000) (suggesting that charter schools may “reduce racial isolation in 
inner-city school districts”). 
 10. See Green, supra note 6, at 19 (explaining why many African-Americans support 
the charter school movement as a way to address their specific needs). 
 11. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL 
SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 1 (2010), available at 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choice-
without-equity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf (“The charter 
effort, which has largely ignored the segregation issue, has been justified by claims about 
superior educational performance, which simply are not sustained by the research.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 12. Id. at 41. Ninety-three percent of charter or traditional public schools where 90% 
of students are black and Latino are also schools in which a majority of students are low-
income. Id. at 72–73. 
 13. Id. at 38 (comparing the percentage of charter and public school students in 
segregated minority schools by race).  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. See Brief of 533 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
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Schools with high concentrations of minority students also tend to have 
lower educational outcomes, as quantified by test scores, high school 
graduation rates, and college graduation rates.17  
A recent federal appellate court decision suggests that students of 
color should also be concerned about the legal protections that charter 
schools might provide to students.18 Because state authorizing statutes 
consistently define charter schools as “public schools,”19 it would appear 
that charter school students are entitled to constitutional protections.20 
Students attending public schools have challenged deprivations of federal 
constitutional and statutory rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
establishes a cause of action for deprivations of federal constitutional and 
statutory rights “under the color of state law.”21 Students have sought 
                                                                                                                 
10, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003) 
(Nos. 05-908 & 05-915) (explaining that teachers are more likely to leave predominantly 
minority schools, resulting in higher teacher turnover). 
 17. See id. (noting the correlation between teacher retention and educational 
outcomes). 
 18. See Caviness v. Horizon Learning Center, 590 F.3d 806, 818 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that the constitutional protections afforded under the state-action doctrine did 
not extend to a charter school in Arizona that had been subsidized and regulated by the 
state).  
 19. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15−181 (2011) (“Charter schools are public schools 
that serve as alternatives to traditional public schools . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.33 
(2011) (“All charter schools in Florida are public schools.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-4J 
(2011) (“A charter school shall be a nonsectarian, nonreligious and non-home-based public 
school.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-503.5(a) (2011) (stating that charter schools are 
“considered to be public schools within the state’s public education system”). Additionally, 
Maryland and Washington, D.C., refer to charter schools as “public charter schools.” See 
MD. EDUC. CODE § 9-102 (2011); DC STAT. § 38-1802.01 (2011). Also, the U.S. Charter 
Schools website, which is supported by the National Alliance of Public Charter Schools, 
defines charter schools as “nonsectarian public schools of choice that operate with freedom 
from many of the regulations that apply to traditional public schools.” See U.S. Dept. of 
State, supra note 3.  
 20. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“The 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its 
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted.”). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“[S]tudents do not shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
 21. Title 42, Section 1983 provides:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.  
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011).  
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damage awards pursuant to § 1983; “actions for injunctive or declaratory 
relief are [also] a major portion of the case law.”22 However, in 2010, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded in Caviness v. Horizon Learning Center23 that a 
private, nonprofit corporation running an Arizona charter school was not a 
state actor under § 1983.24 The Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the 
assertion that charter schools were state actors because they were defined as 
“public schools” under the state statute.25  
This Article examines the dangers that the Caviness case may pose for 
students of color who are attending charter schools. The second section 
provides an overview of § 1983 and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,26 the Supreme 
Court case that examined the statute’s applicability to private schools. The 
third section discusses how courts prior to the Caviness decision have 
addressed the question of whether charter schools are state actors under 
§ 1983. The fourth section discusses the Caviness case. The final section 
explores the legal implications that Caviness may have for the legal rights 
of students of color who attend charter schools.  
II. The State Action Doctrine, Private Schools, and Rendell-Baker 
In Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court first examined the applicability 
of § 1983 to private schools. This case involved a Massachusetts private 
school that served maladjusted students.27 Almost all of the students had 
been referred to the school by city school committees or by a state agency.28 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Mark C. Weber, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, Safford Unified 
School District No. 1 v. Redding, and the Future of Section 1983 Education Litigation, 252 
EDUC. L. REP. 8, 10 (2010). 
 23. See Caviness, 590 F.3d at 808 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the allegations were 
“insufficient to raise a reasonable inference” that the private corporation running a charter 
school was a state actor). 
 24. See id. at 808 (stating that neither the corporation nor its director was proceeding 
as a state actor with regard to employment actions taken against a former teacher). 
 25. See id. at 815 (stating that plaintiff’s “reliance on Arizona’s statutory 
characterization of charter schools as ‘public schools’ does not itself avail him in the 
employment context”). 
 26. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 831 (1982) (finding that a private 
school for maladjusted students was not a state actor). 
 27. See id. at 832 (explaining that the school is a private institution for students with 
drug, alcohol, or behavior problems who have difficulty completing public high schools). 
 28. See id. (noting that most students had been referred by the Brookline or Boston 
School Committees or by the Drug Rehabilitation Division of the Massachusetts Department 
of Mental Health). 
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Public funds had accounted for at least 90 percent of the school’s budget.29 
To be eligible for tuition provided by a state statute, the school had to 
follow a number of regulations “concerning matters ranging from 
recordkeeping to student-teacher ratios.”30 With regard to personnel 
matters, the state statute required the state “to maintain written job 
descriptions and written statements describing personnel standards and 
procedures,” but imposed few specific obligations.31 The school had a 
contract with the Boston School Committee, which stated that the school’s 
employees were not city employees.32 The school also had a contract with 
the state’s drug rehabilitation division.33 Except for general requirements, 
that contract did not cover personnel policies.34  
A vocational counselor and teachers brought separate § 1983 
challenges alleging that the school had fired them in violation of the First, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.35 The First Circuit consolidated the 
actions and dismissed the claims.36 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
and found that the private school was not a state actor.37 According to the 
Court, “[t]he ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to 
suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the 
Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights fairly 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See id. (“In recent years, public funds have accounted for at least 90%, and in one 
year 99%, of respondent school’s operating budget.”). 
 30. Id. at 833.  
 31. Id.  
 32. See id. (stating that the Boston School Committee referred to the school as a 
“contractor” and specified that school employees were not city employees). 
 33. See id.  
 34. See id. (“Except for general requirements, such as an equal employment 
opportunity requirement, the agreement does not cover personnel policies.”). 
 35. See id. at 834–35 (stating that Rendell-Baker (the vocational counselor) brought 
suit in July 1977, followed by five teachers in December 1978, all alleging that their First, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated). See US CONST. amend. IV 
(“The right of the people . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”); U.S. CONST. amend V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2 (“No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”). 
 36. See Rendell-Baker,  457 U.S. 830, 836–37 (providing an overview of the 
procedural history of the case).  
 37. See id. at 837 (affirming the First Circuit’s decision that the private school was not 
a state actor). 
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attributable to the state?”38 The Court answered this question in the 
negative; it found that the school’s relationship with the state “is not 
fundamentally different from many private corporations whose business 
depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dames, ships, or 
submarines for the government.”39 Such agreements did not become state 
action “by reason of their significant or even total engagement in 
performing public contracts.”40 The Court also reasoned that the 
relationship between the school and the teacher did not change because the 
state paid the tuition of the students.41  
Further, the Court found that the state regulations did not make the 
private school a state actor.42 “[I]n contrast to the extensive regulation of 
the school generally,” the Court asserted that “the various regulators 
showed relatively little interest in the school’s personnel matters.”43 The 
Court rejected the argument that the school was a state actor because it 
performed the public function of providing education.44 To qualify as a 
state action, the function would have to be the “exclusive prerogative of 
state.”45 The legislature’s decision to provide services to maladjusted 
students at the public’s expense “in no way makes these services the 
exclusive province of the State.”46 Moreover, the Court rejected the 
argument that the fiscal relationship between the school and the state 
created a “symbiotic relationship,” thus making the school a state actor.47 
This was the case because the school’s fiscal relationship was similar to that 
of many contractors performing governmental services.48  
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. at 838 (internal quotation omitted).  
 39. Id. at 840–41.  
 40. Id. at 841.  
 41. Id. (analogizing the school to a public defender who, though paid by the state, had 
a relationship with her client like that of any other attorney and client). 
 42. See id. (explaining that the school’s decision to discharge the petitioners was 
unrelated to state regulations).  
 43. Id.  
 44. See id. at 842 (stating that the relevant question goes beyond whether a private 
group is serving a public function).  
 45. See id. (discussing what private activities receive constitutional protections under 
the state action doctrine’s public function exception) (emphasis in the original).  
 46. Id. (reasoning that government programs to aid maladjusted students do not make 
those programs the exclusive province of the state qualifying for the public function 
exception to the state action doctrine). 
 47. See id. (reasoning that providing the school with government aid did not transform 
the private school into a tool for state action). 
 48. See id. at 843 (explaining that the funding provided to the school was similar to 
many contractual relationships the government shares with private actors which are not 
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III. Charter Schools and § 1983 prior to the Caviness Case 
In Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court held that a private school was 
not a state actor under § 1983 for the purposes of employment issues for 
four reasons.49 First, the contractual relationship with the state was similar 
to other contracts between private corporations and state governments.50 
Second, the state employment regulations were not extensive.51 Third, 
providing special education services to students was not the exclusive 
province of the state.52 Fourth, the fiscal relationship between the school 
and the state was similar to other contracts for public services.53  
The hybrid nature of charter schools raises the question of whether 
charter schools are state actors under § 1983 or private entities that are 
merely providing a public service. Prior to the Caviness case, federal courts 
in Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio have examined the question 
of whether charter schools were state actors under § 1983. All of these 
courts concluded in the affirmative. This section provides an overview of 
those cases. 
A. Ohio 
In 2002, an Ohio federal district court first addressed the question of 
whether charter schools and the private companies that operated these 
schools were state actors. In this case, Riester v. Riverside Community 
School,54 a terminated teacher sued the charter school and the management 
companies that provided services for that school under § 1983. She alleged 
that the charter school and the management companies violated her First 
                                                                                                                 
transformed into state actors).  
 49. See id. at 841–42 (holding that a private school was not a state actor because the 
contractual, regulatory, and fiscal relationship, plus the services provided by the school, did 
not indicate the school was a state actor).  
 50. See id. at 841 (reasoning that the contract with the school resembled contracts 
between the government and other private corporations not deemed state actors via the 
contractual relationship). 
 51. See id. (reasoning the state regulation over the private school was insufficient to 
make the school a state actor). 
 52. See id. at 842 (reasoning that because the state was not the sole provider of special 
education services, the fact that the school offered such services did not make the school a 
state actor). 
 53. See id. (reasoning that because the contract with the school resembled other 
contracts for public services, the contract did not make the school a state actor). 
 54. Riester v. Riverside Cmty. Sch., 257 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2002).  
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Amendment rights by terminating her in retaliation for her complaints 
pertaining to the lack of services for a troubled student.55  
The charter school and the management companies then moved to 
dismiss the claim on the ground that the charter school and management 
companies were not state actors under § 1983.56 The court denied the 
motion.57 It found that the state charter school law defined charter schools 
as public schools.58 It thus followed that the charter school, and by 
extension the management companies, were state actors.59 The court further 
found that management companies were state actors under the public 
function and entwinement tests—two tests used to determine whether 
private companies are state actors.60 
Under the public function test, a private company is a state actor when 
it provides a traditional state function.61 The court found that the 
management companies were state actors because “free, public education, 
whether provided by public or private educators, is an historical, exclusive, 
and traditional state function.”62 The court rejected the defendant’s 
assertion that Rendell-Baker required a different conclusion because: (1) the 
charter school was created “only with the help of the state,” and (2) the 
charter school “is subject to various rules and regulations to which private 
schools are not.”63  
The court also agreed that the management companies were state 
actors under the entwinement test, which states that private conduct may 
become so “entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a 
governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See id. at 969 (providing the facts which led to allegations of retaliation against a 
teacher by Riverside Community School). 
 56. See id. at 970 (stating that Riverside filed a motion to dismiss because the school 
was not a state actor). 
 57. See id. (denying Riverside’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff pled a proper 
retaliation claim). 
 58. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.01 (West 2011) (declaring that community 
schools formed in Ohio are public schools and part of the state education system). 
 59. Riester, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 972 (reasoning that Ohio statutes and precedent deem 
charter schools to be public schools, and as such are state actors). 
 60. See id. (discussing the entanglements and public function exceptions to the state 
action doctrine). 
 61. See id. (discussing the requirements of the public function doctrine). 
 62. See id. (holding that the management companies satisfied the public function test 
because schooling was traditionally the exclusive province of the state). 
 63. See id. at 972−73 (holding that Riverside Community School satisfied the public 
function doctrine). 
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limitations of state actors.”64 The court concluded that the private 
companies were state actors under the entwinement test because “they have 
been granted the authority to provide free public education to all students in 
a nondiscriminatory manner; no other entity . . . has been so mandated by 
the State of Ohio besides local school districts.”65  
B. Pennsylvania 
In 2003, a federal district court in Pennsylvania found that charter 
schools were state actors under § 1983. In Irene B. v. Philadelphia 
Academy Charter School,66 parents of a student attending a charter school 
filed a § 1983 action alleging that a charter school violated the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).67 The child, who was attending a 
Philadelphia public school, was a “15-year old boy with Down Syndrome, 
mental retardation, and profound hearing loss in his right ear.”68 His mother 
contacted the founder and principal of the charter school, who told the 
mother that it could meet his educational needs and would develop a new 
Individual Educational Plan (IEP) for the child that would incorporate life 
skills and academics.69 When the child enrolled as an eighth-grader in the 
school, his parents provided the school with his IEP, which was developed 
by the Philadelphia School District.70 The parents asserted that other than 
speech therapy and bus transportation, the charter school failed to provide 
the services promised to their child under his prior IEP.71 Also, the parents 
claimed that the charter school failed to develop a new IEP as it had 
promised.72  
                                                                                                                 
 64. See id. at 972 (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that the management 
companies satisfied the entwinement exception to the state action doctrine). 
 65. See id. (holding that the management companies also qualify for the public 
function exception because the state allows no other entity besides those companies aside 
from school districts to provide public education). 
 66. Irene B. v. Phila. Acad. Charter Sch., No. Civ.A. 02–1716, 2003 WL 24052009, 
*1, (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2003). 
 67. See id. at *1 (alleging that Philadelphia Charter Academy School violated the 
IDEA by not developing programs to meet the needs of students with learning disabilities).  
 68. Id. at *2.  
 69. See id. (explaining that the school assured the student’s mother before his 
enrollment that the school could accommodate his learning disability).  
 70. See id. (recounting the events prior to the dispute, including providing the school 
with the disabled student's IEP). 
 71. See id. (explaining that the school failed to provide the services it promised to 
provide the disabled child under a IEP). 
 72. See id. (explaining that the school failed to develop a new IEP for the disabled 
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The parents then sued in district court alleging a violation of IDEA.73 
The court rejected the charter school’s motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted.74 The court found that the 
§ 1983 claim could proceed because “[i]t is now well-settled that a 
municipal entity is a state actor for purposes of liability under § 1983.”75 
Public school districts were municipal entities.76 Similarly, the court noted 
that because charter schools were independent public schools, they were 
part of the school system.77 Thus, it was appropriate to treat charter schools 
as state actors with respect to IDEA claims.78  
C. New York 
In 2006 and 2007, two New York federal district courts also concluded 
that charter schools were state actors under § 1983. In the 2006 decision, 
Matwijko v. Board of Trustees of Global Concepts of Charter School,79 a 
former teacher alleged that the principal and the board of a charter school 
terminated her, in violation of the First Amendment,80 because of her 
actions as chairperson of the school’s advisory council.81 The defendants 
moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the defendants 
were not state actors pursuant to § 1983.82  
                                                                                                                 
student as it promised the parents it would).  
 73. See id. at *1 (explaining the claims for violations of the IDEA filed by the 
student’s parents against the school). 
 74. See id. (detailing the various claims which the court is dismissing and which are 
sufficient to state a claim). 
 75. Id. at *11.  
 76. See id. (explaining that the Philadelphia school district system is a municipal 
entity). 
 77. See id. (explaining that because the charter school was a public school, it was part 
of the public school system and thus a municipal entity acting under color of law for the 
purposes of the state action doctrine). 
 78. See id. (explaining that because the charter school acted under the color of law as 
part of a municipal entity, the plaintiffs may state a claim under the IDEA). 
 79. Matwijko v. Bd. of Trs. of Global Concepts Charter Sch., No. 04-CV-663A, 2006 
WL 2466868 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 80. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech.”). 
 81. Matwijko, No. 04-CV-663A, 2006 WL 2466868, at *1 (explaining that the 
plaintiff filed a complaint for retaliatory firing in response to her criticisms of the defendant's 
allegedly unlawful practices). 
 82. See id. (explaining that the defendants moved to dismiss the claims by asserting 
the state action doctrine did not apply). 
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The court denied the defendants’ motion on the ground that the New 
York charter school statute provides that charter schools are independent 
and autonomous public schools performing essential public purposes and 
governmental purposes of the state.83 The court also noted that charter 
schools had “to meet the same health and safety, civil rights, and student 
assessment requirements applicable to other public schools.”84 
Additionally, charter schools received 100% of the per-pupil funding 
provided to other public schools, and any public student was qualified for 
admission to a charter school.85 Further, the school code permitted charter 
school employees to participate in the public retirement system and 
afforded these employees protection under New York’s civil service law.86 
Therefore, the fact that the code did not consider charter schools otherwise 
as public employers “did not remove them from the realm of state actors.”87 
The court concluded that the legislature intended charter schools to be 
public schools despite the fact that they were exempted “from certain 
regulatory burdens associated with traditional public schools.”88 The court 
found that Rendell-Baker was inapplicable because New York law did not 
consider charter schools to be private schools.89  
In Scaggs v. New York State Department of Education,90 students 
attending a charter school brought a § 1983 action against a charter school 
and Edison Schools (“Edison”), the private entity that operated the school.91 
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Americans with 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at *5 (emphasis in the original).  
 84. Id. (emphasis in the original).  
 85. See id. at *3 (explaining that charter school students receive the same funding on a 
per-student basis as other public schools, and that public school students were eligible to 
attend the charter school). 
 86. See id. at *4 (explaining that employees of the charter school receive the same 
legal protections and retirement entitlements as public school employees). 
 87. See id. at *5 (concluding that, although the state code did not consider charter 
schools public schools, it did not preclude the possibility and that circumstances support a 
finding that the charter school was a state actor). 
 88. See id. (concluding that the charter school was a public school despite a laxer 
regulatory burden than most public schools have). 
 89. See id. (distinguishing Rendell-Kohn by indicating that New York law does not 
consider charter schools to be private schools). 
 90. See Scaggs v. N.Y. Dep’t of Educ., No. 06–CV–0799, 2007 WL 1456221, *24 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denying it in part). 
 91. See id. at *2 (detailing the procedural history behind the case, including the initial 
complaint filed against defendant claiming their right to a free education was violated by the 
defendants). 
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Disabilities Act,92 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,93 and the Equal 
Protection Clause.94 The defendants moved to dismiss the claim on the 
ground that Edison was not a state actor.95 The district court contrasted the 
instant case to Rendell-Baker. Because Rendell-Baker was an employment 
action regarding a single teacher; the state was “only minimally or 
tangentially involved.”96 Conversely, the plaintiffs’ allegations in the 
instant case “relate[d] to the alleged total inadequacy of a school to provide 
free public education to its students while receiving state funding, being 
bound by educational standards and purporting to offer the same 
educational services and facilities as any other public school.”97 Because 
the plaintiffs’ claims challenged the quality of education provided by 
charter schools, the court held their § 1983 claim may proceed.98  
D. Illinois 
In 2009, several months prior to the Caviness decision, a federal 
district court in Illinois held that a not-for-profit organization that owned a 
charter school was a state actor pursuant to § 1983.99 In this case, Jordan v. 
Northern Kane Educational Corp., the not-for-profit organization 
(“NKEC”) relieved an employee of her duties as executive director of the 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2009) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”).  
 93. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2002) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability . . . be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”). 
 94. See Scaggs, No. 06–CV–0799, 2007 WL 1456221 at *3 (detailing the various 
claims filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant). See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 95. See Scaggs, No. 06–CV–0799, 2007 WL 1456221 at *3 (discussing the motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that Edison did not qualify as a state actor). 
 96. See id. at *13 (distinguishing Rendell-Baker because that case involved 
employment action against a single teacher and only minimally involved the state). 
 97. See id. (distinguishing Rendell-Baker because this case involved the provision of 
facilities and services related to public education, which bears more directly on state action 
than the employment action in Rendell-Baker). 
 98. See id. (holding that the claim may be brought against Edison because it provides 
public education services). 
 99. See Jordan v. N. Kane Educ. Corp., No. 08 C 4477, 2009 WL 509744, *3 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
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charter school and made her a full-time teacher.100 NKEC later terminated 
her employment as a teacher.101 The former employee then filed a 
complaint under § 1983, alleging that NKEC violated her due process rights 
by failing to provide a hearing before firing her.102 NKEC moved to dismiss 
the claim on the ground that it was not a state actor under § 1983.103  
The district court denied NKEC’s motion to dismiss.104 The court 
observed that although Illinois’s charter school law did provide that charter 
schools were public entities, it failed to address explicitly whether the entity 
that owned the charter school was a public entity.105 However, the charter 
school law did provide that “governing bod[ies] of charter school[s] [were] 
subject to the same disclosure requirements that applied to other [state] 
governmental entities.”106 Therefore, it was apparent that the legislature 
intended charter school bodies to function as public entities.107 
Consequently, the court concluded that NKEC was a state actor pursuant to 
§ 1983.108 
E. The Caviness Case 
Prior to the Caviness case, federal district courts consistently found 
that charter schools, their governing boards, and the private companies that 
either provide services or run these schools were state actors pursuant to 
§ 1983.109 The courts in New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania ruled in this 
fashion because the state charter school laws defined charter schools either 
as public schools or municipal entities. An Illinois district court held that a 
private entity operating a charter school was a state actor because charter 
school governing boards were subject to the same disclosure requirements 
as other state governmental bodies.110 By contrast, in Caviness, the Ninth 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at *1.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at *3.  
 105. Id. at *2.  
 106. Id. at *3.  
 107. See id. (“It therefore appears that the Illinois legislature . . . intended that the 
governing body of a charter school function as a public, government entity.”).  
 108. Id.  
 109. See supra section III (discussing cases decided prior to the Caviness case).  
 110. See Jordan v. N. Kane Educ. Corp., No. 08 C 4477, 2009 WL 509744 (N.D. Ill. 
2009) (ruling that a charter school should be treated as a government entity).  
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Circuit held that a private, non-profit corporation that operated an Arizona 
charter high school was not a state actor in § 1983.111 This section provides 
an overview of the Caviness case. 
1. Background 
In February 2006, a female student accused Michael Caviness, a 
physical education teacher and track coach working at the charter school, of 
crossing student-teacher boundaries.112 The private entity running the 
charter school (“Horizon”) placed Caviness on paid leave and then 
investigated the student’s claims.113 The Horizon board held a hearing in 
which it—but not the teacher—questioned the student.114 The board 
concluded that Caviness had exercised questionable judgment with regards 
to his interactions with the student and decided not to renew his teaching 
and coaching contract.115 The board decided to keep Caviness on paid leave 
until the end of his contract in June 2006.116 
In April 2006, the executive director of Horizon wrote a letter to 
Caviness that he also sent to the Arizona Department of Education.117 
Caviness claimed that the letter made several false and defamatory claims 
about him.118 In July 2006, Caviness applied for a position as a teacher and 
a coach in another Arizona school district. The district refused to hire 
Caviness after the executive director of Horizon declined the school 
district’s request to rate his ability and knowledge as a teacher.119 
In August 2006, Caviness’s attorney sent a letter to Horizon claiming 
that a Horizon employee had called him a pedophile.120 The letter 
demanded that Horizon provide written evidence that it had instructed all of 
its agents and employees to refrain making such claims.121 The executive 
director did not address this demand in his written response; Caviness 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(finding that a charter high school was not a state actor). 
 112. Id. at 810.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 811.  
 121. Id. 
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asserted that another Horizon teacher subsequently falsely called him a 
pedophile.122  
In December 2006, Caviness requested a name-clearing hearing to 
address Horizon’s conduct following the March 2006 hearing.123 Horizon 
did not answer this request.124  
2. District Court Decision 
In March 2007, Caviness filed a complaint under § 1983 in the United 
States District Court of Arizona.125 Caviness claimed that Horizon, acting 
under the color of state law, deprived him of his liberty interest in “finding 
and obtaining work without due process by making ‘several false 
statements about’ him ‘in connection with his employment’” without 
providing him notice or a name-clearing hearing.126 The district court 
granted Horizon’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which 
relief could be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).127 It 
rejected Caviness’s claim that Horizon was a state actor because of the 
enabling statute’s characterization of it as a “public school.”128 The district 
court also rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the school was a state actor 
because it performed the public function of education.129 
3. Circuit Court Decision 
Caviness then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.130 The court affirmed the 
district court’s motion to dismiss with respect to the § 1983 claim.131 The 
Ninth Circuit observed that it would find that Horizon was a state actor “if, 
though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the 
challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as 
that of the state itself.”132 To determine whether there was a close nexus, the 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 818.  
 132. Id. at 812 (citations omitted).  
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court’s inquiry began by examining the specific conduct at issue because an 
entity may be a state actor for some matters but not others.133 The Ninth 
Circuit then found that Caviness failed to argue that Horizon’s specific 
conduct rendered it a state actor.134 Instead, Caviness asserted that Horizon 
was a state actor as a matter of law under the state’s charter school 
scheme.135 “Therefore,” the court reasoned, “Caviness’s appeal must fail 
unless being an Arizona charter school, is by that fact alone, sufficient to 
make Horizon the government for employment purposes.”136 
The court rejected Caviness’s first argument that charter schools were 
state actors for all purposes, including employment matters, under the 
state’s statutory and regulatory scheme.137 In support of his assertion, 
Caviness observed that Arizona statutes defined charter schools as “public 
schools” and that the state attorney general had concluded that charter 
schools were political subdivisions under the state open meeting act.138 The 
court disagreed with this argument because a private entity may be a state 
actor for some purposes but not others.139  
Caviness also argued that Horizon was a state actor because it 
provided public education, which Caviness characterized as a “function that 
is ‘traditionally and exclusively under the prerogative of the state.’”140 The 
Ninth Circuit countered that Rendell-Baker foreclosed this argument.141 The 
Ninth Circuit found that the instant case was like Rendell-Baker in that the 
Arizona statute authorized the charter school sponsor to provide alternative 
educational choices at public expense.142 As in Rendell-Baker, such a 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. at 812–13.  
 134. Id. at 813.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 813–14.  
 139. Id. at 814. Caviness also cited a Sixth Circuit case, Greater Heights Acad. v. 
Zelman, 522 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2008), which found that charter schools were state actors 
under § 1983 because they were political subdivisions under Ohio law.  Caviness, 590 F.3d 
at 814. The Ninth Circuit found that Greater Heights Academy was irrelevant because it says 
nothing about Arizona’s charter school law.  Id. 
 140. Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 141. See id. at 815 (countering that the legislative policy choice of allowing private 
organizations to run charter schools did not make education the exclusive province of the 
state).  
 142. See id. (discussing the similarities between Caviness and Rendell-Baker).  
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legislative choice did not place these services under the exclusive power of 
the state.143  
Third, Caviness claimed that Horizon was a state actor because the 
state regulated personnel issues related to charter schools.144 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this assertion, noting that state action may occur if the state 
had exercised coercive power over the private entity.145 On the other hand, 
subjecting a business to mere regulation did not convert the private entity 
into a state actor.146 Even extensive regulations did not make a private 
entity a state actor if the regulations did not compel the private entity’s 
challenged conduct.147 The court found that the charter school statute did 
not control Horizon’s post-termination decisions.148 Indeed, the statute 
expressly exempted Horizon from all rules relating to school districts, 
including providing employees the right to a hearing after dismissal.149 The 
Ninth Circuit found further support for its conclusion because of the 
absence of any reference to charter schools in the statutory provisions 
related to certified teachers’ employment rights.150 Additionally, the court 
found that the fact that charter schools could participate in the state’s 
retirement system did not make Horizon a state actor.151 It was settled case 
law that states could subsidize the operating costs of a private entity 
“without converting its acts into those of the state.”152 Moreover, the Ninth 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See id. (explaining the court’s reasoning that even substantial state involvement in 
the charter school did not rise to the level necessary for it to be a state actor).  
 144. See id. at 816 (presenting Caviness’ argument for Horizon being a state actor).  
 145. See id. (“A state may be responsible for a private entity’s actions if it has exercised 
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that 
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 
991, 1004 (1982))).  
 146. See id. (stating that general state regulation is insufficient to make a business a 
state actor).  
 147. See id. (“Even extensive government regulation of a private business is insufficient 
to make that business a state actor if the challenged conduct is was not ‘compelled or even 
influenced by any state regulation.’” (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982))).  
 148. See id. at 817 (analyzing the Arizona Revised Statues, to conclude that Horizon 
was not bound by any state regulation in its post-termination proceedings).  
 149. See id. (“Horizon is expressly ‘exempt from all statutes and rules relating to 
schools, governing boards and school districts.’” (citing Arizona Revised Statutes § 15-
187(A), (B))).  
 150. See id. at 816 (“The absence of any reference to charter schools in the statutory 
sections governing certified teachers’ employment rights supports our conclusion.”).  
 151. See id. (providing that a state’s subsidization of a private business does not convert 
that business into a state actor).  
 152. Id. at 817.  
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Circuit rejected the fact that Horizon became a state actor because its 
sponsor had the power to approve and review its charter school, including 
its personnel policies.153 Mere approval of the actions of private entities did 
not convert their personnel decisions into state action.154 This was the case 
even when the state had the initial power to review the qualifications of the 
schools’ employees.155  
IV. The Implications of the Caviness Case for Students of Color 
Although the Caviness case was an employment case, it is important to 
recognize that a similar analysis could lead to the conclusion that charter 
schools are not state actors with respect to student constitutional issues. 
Students attending public schools are guaranteed constitutional 
protections.156 There are constitutional safeguards for student expression.157 
Public school students are protected from unreasonable search and 
seizure.158 The Constitution also requires public schools to provide 
procedural due process safeguards when suspending or expelling 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See id. (explaining that reviewability of personnel decisions does not rise to the 
level of state actions).  
 154. See id. (stating that acquiescence or approval by the state did not make private 
entities into state actors).  
 155. See id. (“Even when the state has the power ‘initially to review the qualifications 
of a[n employee] selected by the school,’ such regulation is not sufficient to make the 
school’s employment-related actions those of the state.” (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 
U.S. 830, 838 (1982))).  
 156. See W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“The 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its 
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted.”). 
 157. See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 (1988) (“[Students] cannot be 
punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school premises-whether ‘in the 
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours,’ (citing 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13(1969))); Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407–09 (2007) (elaborating on the safeguards in place for student 
expression at schools).  
 158. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (“Rather, the legality of a 
search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of 
the search.”); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (“As the text 
of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a 
government search is ‘reasonableness.’”) The Court goes further to state that “special needs” 
exist in the public school context, which means that the warrant requirement would interfere 
with swift disciplinary procedures. Id. at 653; Board of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of 
Potttawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002) (examining the protections students 
are afforded from unreasonable search and seizures).  
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students.159 Of the seven states in the Ninth Circuit with legislation 
authorizing charter schools,160 only Oregon guarantees that all federal rights 
apply to charter schools.161 With the exception of Oregon, state legislatures 
do not compel charter schools to follow constitutional guidelines with 
respect to due process. California and Idaho merely require potential charter 
school operators to disclose their disciplinary policies in their initial charter 
application.162 Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Nevada do not even demand 
that charter schools disclose their disciplinary policies at the time of 
application.163  
In Goss v. Lopez,164 the Supreme Court held that students subject to 
suspensions of ten or fewer days were entitled to due process.165 A student 
facing such a suspension had a right to “be given oral or written notice of 
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the 
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the 
story.”166 The Goss Court also observed that “[l]onger suspensions or 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (discussing the property and liberty 
interests public school students have in receiving a fair hearing before being suspended or 
expelled).  
 160. Montana and Washington have no legislation authorizing the operation of charter 
schools. See Rev. Code Wash. § 28A.208.010 (demonstrating that a Washington state 
referendum blocked the charter school provisions from becoming law).  
 161. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 338.115(1)(a) (2011) (explicitly stating that Federal law 
applies to public charter schools). Arizona’s charter school law limits its protection of 
students to the First Amendment. See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-110 (2011) (detailing 
Arizona’s protections of students’ religious viewpoint and expression).  
 162. See Calif. Educ. Code § 47605 (2011) (explicating the process of forming a charter 
school in California); see also Idaho Stat. § 33-5205 (2011) (detailing Idaho’s process for 
the formation of a charter school).  
 163. Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii and Nevada provide the minimum requirements for an 
application to form a charter school in each respective state. The statutes, in general, discuss 
educational quality, employment, facility selection, and governance. None of the statutes 
explicitly require that charter schools during the charter application process disclose their 
proposed disciplinary policies and how those policies will protect the rights of students. See 
Alaska Stat. Ann. § 14.03.255, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-183(a), Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 302(b)-
5, 302(b)-6, and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 386.520(4). Both Alaska and Nevada explicitly grant their 
respective boards of education power to prescribe additional charter application 
requirements. This grant of power does not, however, guarantee that the administrative 
agencies will create the additional requirement of disclosing disciplinary policies and 
practices. See Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.03.280 and Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.520(4). 
 164. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).  
 165. See id. (“Students facing temporary suspension from a public school have property 
and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 166. Id. at 584.  
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expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may 
require more formal procedures.”167 Circuit courts that have determined the 
due process requirements in situations involving long-term suspensions and 
expulsions have employed the balancing test of the Supreme Court’s 
Matthews v. Eldridge168 to determine whether additional due process was 
required.169 Matthews requires the Court to balance three factors:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.170 
If constitutional due process does not govern the charter school-
student relationship, then it is quite possible that a court will find that 
contract law applies, as in the case of private schools.171 Courts are very 
reluctant to intervene in the suspension and expulsion decisions of private 
schools.172 If a private school “has clearly stated the rule, preferably in 
writing, and a parent chooses to have his or her child attend the school, a  
court will generally uphold the rule.”173 In Flint v. Augustine High 
School,174 for example, a Louisiana private school expelled two students for 
violating its no smoking policy.175 The school’s handbook called for a fine 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Id.  
 168. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
 169. See Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 923–24 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(“Without the aid of Supreme Court authority directly on point, we are left with resolving 
the procedural due process issues presented in this appeal under the more general rubric of 
Matthews v. Eldridge.”); Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(applying the test established in Matthews v. Eldridge); Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 
242 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (showing how different courts have utilized the 
Matthews test in analyzing potential due process violations in educational settings).  
 170. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.  
 171. See David Pollack & David Schnall, Expelling and Suspending Students: An 
American and Jewish Legal Perspective, 9 New Eng. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 334, 343 (2003) 
(“Private schools, regardless of whether they include religious teachings, are governed by a 
contract between the parent and the school.”).  
 172. See id. (demonstrating the courts reticence to engage in overturning private school 
suspensions and expulsions).  
 173. Mary A. Shaughnessy, Civil Law and Catholic Education: Past, Present, and 
Future, 12 Catholic Educ: A J. of Inquiry & Practice, 519, 527 (2003).  
 174. Flint v. St. Augustine High School, 323 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 1975).  
 175. See id. at 230–31 (showing that the school had a specific policy against smoking, 
of which students were made aware in the student handbook).  
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of ten dollars for the first offense, and expulsion for the second offense.176 
The state court of appeals upheld the suspension of the students.177 In 
reaching its decision, the court declared that private institutions “have a 
near absolute right and power to control their own internal disciplinary 
procedure which, by its very nature, includes the right and power to dismiss 
students.”178 Although the court allowed that due process protections could 
not “be cavalierly ignored or disregarded," it held that "if there is color of 
due process—that is enough.”179  
Students of color attending charter schools should be concerned about 
the potential lack of constitutional due process protection. Studies of data at 
the national, state, district, and building levels have consistently found that 
students of color are suspended at two to three times the rate of other 
students.180 African-American students should be especially concerned 
about the possible lack of due process protection.181 According to the U.S. 
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, in the 1970s African-
Americans were two times more likely than white students to be suspended 
from school.182 By 2002, the risk of suspension for African-Americans 
increased to nearly three times that of white students.183 Further, a study of 
office discipline referrals in 364 elementary and middle schools during the 
2005–06 school year found that African-American students were more than 
two times as likely to be referred to the office for disciplinary issues as 
white students.184 The same study found that African-American students 
were also four times more likely to be sent to the principal’s office than 
white students.185  
                                                                                                                 
 176. See id. at 230 (quoting from the student handbook).  
 177. See id. at 235 (“These young men were obliged, while at St. Augustine High 
School, to do as they were required by the rules of the school—which they deliberately 
chose to ignore.”). 
 178. Id. at 234.  
 179. Id. at 235. 
 180. See Russell J. Skiba et. al, Race is Not Neutral: A National Investigation of 
African American and Latino Disproportionality in School Discipline, 40 SCH. PSYCH. REV. 
85, 86 (2011) (showing that this has remained the case for over twenty-five years).  
 181. See id. (“Documentation of disciplinary overrepresentation for African American 
students has been highly consistent.”). 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. at 101.  
 185. Id.  
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V. Conclusion 
Because of their foci on autonomy and accountability, supporters of 
charter schools have argued that they are the perfect vehicle for addressing 
the educational needs of students of color. This article points out, however, 
that charter schools may not be state actors under federal law with respect 
to student rights. Consequently, students of color may be unwittingly 
surrendering protections guaranteed under the Constitution in order to 
enroll in charter schools. 
  
